Despite a growing number of models argument for the logical possibility of changing the past there continues to be resistance to and confusion surrounding the possibility of changing the past. In this paper I shall attempt to mitigate the resistance and alleviate at least some of the confusion by distinguishing changing the past from what Richard Hanley calls ‘annulling’ the past and distinguishing both from what I shall call ‘otherwising’ the past.

David Hitchcock, in his recent “Informal Logic and the Concept of Argument”, defends a recursive definition of ‘argument.’ I present and discuss several problems that arise for his definition. I argue that refining Hitchcock’s definition in order to resolve these problems reveals a crucial, but minimally explicated, relation that was, at best, playing an obscured role in the original definition or, at worst, completely absent from the original definition.

According to the prevailing sentiment, changing the past is logically impossible. The prevailing sentiment is wrong. In this paper, I argue that the claim that changing the past entails a contradiction ultimately rests upon an empirical assumption, and so the conclusion that changing the past is logically impossible is to be resisted. I then present and discuss a model of time which drops the empirical assumption and coherently models changing the past. Finally, I defend the model, and changing the past, (...) against objections. (shrink)

Papers presented at the All India Seminar on "Analytical Studies in Buddhist Philosophy", Bhubaneswar, December 1980.

Numerous informal logi- cians and argumentation theorists restrict their theorizing to what they call “real” arguments. But is there a clear distinction to be made between “real” and “non-real” arguments? Here I explore four possible accounts of the alleged distinction and argue that none can serve the theoretical uses to which the distinction is most often put. Résumé: Plusieurs logiciens construction formels et théoriciens de l’argument- ation limitent leur non de théories à ce qu’ils appellent des arguments « authentiques ». (...) Mais y-a- t’il une distinction claire entre des arguments« authentiques » et « inau- thentiques » ? Ici j’explore quatre descriptions possibles de cette préten- due distinction et je soutiens qu’- aucune ne répond aux besoins théori- ques auxquels elles sont censées ré- pondre. (shrink)

The Cambridge Capital Controversy was one of the most significant debates in Twentieth Century economics. First published in 1972, this book provides an accessible reconstruction of the controversy with detailed discussion of the major points raised by its primary protagonists: Piero Sraffa and Joan Robinson on the post-Keynesian side and Robert Solow and Paul Samuelson on the neo-classical side. The book is now considered to be a classic. This fiftieth anniversary edition comes with a new preface by the author and (...) two new afterwords that reflect on the author's contribution to the field and the significance of the book in the history of economics. Topics covered include the measurement of capital, the revival of interest in Irving Fisher's rate of return on investment, the double-switching debate, Sraffa's prelude to a critique of neoclassical theory, and the 'new' theories of the rate of profits in capitalist society. (shrink)